Praxeology and Human Rights

At a glance:

• Praxeology serves as the logical basis for all rights derived from the logical structure of human action;
• Absolute in its epistemic objectivity;
• Entirely value-free due to its basis in verbal, logical analysis rather than empirical methodology;
• Regarding human action which fundamentally has an ontologically subjective mode of existence (with ontologically objective physical correlates);
• Self-ownership is implied by both the Action and A Priori of Argumentation Axioms and is a necessary precondition for human action and argumentation;
• Follows the Non-Aggression Principle as implied in the Action and A Priori of Argumentation Axioms;
• Serves to establish rights as a conflict-resolution method in order to determine proper action with respect to use of scarce means to achieve ends in situations of conflict with other persons, the government, or institutional entities;
• Rights must be in the form of negative liberty rights—not positive claim “rights”—in order to meet the requirement of a peaceful conflict resolution system and accord with the Non-Aggression Principle;
• Must follow the principle of compossibility to be internally consistent, which means that a set of rights is not contradictory and can be respected and protected for everyone;
• Provides the practical, logical framework for deontology and morality;
• Provides substance to the agency-based justification of Human Rights due to the Action and A Priori of Argumentation Axioms;
• It is in the nature of man to always act, and in this way, the praxeological basis of rights relates to the nature of man explicitly;
• The logical structure of action does not change with time which provides a structure of rights which is valid indefinitely into the future;
• Harmonizes political economy and political philosophy;
• Since praxeology is an analysis of the logical structure of action it can be considered a logical basis for the structure of Natural Law;
• Establishes the foundation for equality in the sense of equality of rights;
• Since praxeological analysis is a logical analysis of action, all men are inherently treated equally:  Praxeologically, all men are absolutely equal;
• This aspect of self-ownership is fundamentally inalienable:  No government grants nor can take away the praxeological Right of Self-Ownership.

RIGHTS require a conception of human nature (Searle, 2010: 191), and one essential element of the nature of man is to act. While there are certainly other relevant elements of human nature, human action is the most fundamental to the subjects of rights. With a logical analysis of the implications of the categories of human action, a system of rights can be explicitly established based on this nature of man. The grounding of universal Human Rights needs to be on the universal nature of man, and his nature to act permits the logical establishment of a system of rights resulting from the logical analysis of the structure of human action known as praxeology. The philosopher John Searle has suggested that rights be based on human nature (Searle, 2010: 189) by claiming that man is a speech performing animal and, therefore, ought to have the Right of Freedom of Speech (Searle, 2010: 189). However, this is a very narrow view and does not provide a principled basis for further rights. Searle has claimed that an axiology is necessary (Searle, 2010: 192), but this creates even more contentious propositions as to what ought to be considered valuable.[1] There have been numerous other attempts to base Human Rights on the nature of man[2] but a primary concern with such conceptions is always the appeal to nature fallacy.

However, the fact that man acts is one of the most fundamental aspects of his nature and is amenable to praxeological analysis which, as will be demonstrated, permits a principled derivation of rights. Praxeology can utilize human nature in a manner which is fundamental and most relevant to the topic of rights, which is regarding the action of man in society. While praxeology is an axiomatic system, it is not to be confused with a rationalistic political philosophy which establishes its systems based on postulates of human nature, which historically dichotomized into postulates of either a fundamentally good or bad nature such as found with Rousseau and Machiavelli, respectively (Bronowski & Mazlish, 1960: 33). What is most important is that since praxeology is not based on empirical observations regarding man’s nature, it avoids the appeal to nature fallacy and can provide epistemically objective normativity. Nor does such an analysis run the risk of being culturally, ideologically, or temporally bound. In this way, praxeological analysis can provide a truly universal basis for a system of rights.

Praxeology is the study of human action and is best known and elaborated in the work of Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises, particularly in his treatise Human Action (1949). Economics is the most developed branch of praxeology, but it is essential to recognize that praxeology is not identical with economics and that praxeology underlies all human action. Game theory may be a more familiar subset of praxeology for most (Rothbard, 2011: 117) which explores the logical consequences of human action in conflict and cooperative situations.

Praxeology is the analysis of the logical structure of human action, which has an ontologically subjective mode of existence. However, the logical analysis of the categories of action has absolute epistemic objectivity which permits apodictic, although limited, a priori and universal understanding of the structure of human action through the derivation of implications and qualitative laws of human action. It is critical to understand that ontological subjectivity does not in any way imply epistemic subjectivity. An absence of understanding of this point will result in an inability to understand the very basis of praxeology and all of the conclusions which result.

It is imperative to understand the difference between the ontologically subjective mode of existence of human action and the ontologically objective mode of existence of invariant quantitative relations which comprise the subject matter of the physical sciences. As elaborated in this section, human action is purposeful and, therefore, teleological in that it aims at ends and that actions are on reasons, whether conscious or subconscious, and can be based on ontologically subjective entities such as social institutions. Ultimately, actions occur through consciousness and are influenced in varying degrees by conscious and unconscious cognition; automatisms and unconscious reflexes do not constitute action. However, praxeology is concerned with action as such and not the psychological reasons for action, so any psychological considerations are irrelevant to the praxeological analysis.[3]

To be sure, praxeology is not based on invariant quantitative physical relations and, therefore, unable to be mathematically represented in the manner found in the physical sciences. Conflating the ontologically subjective mode of human action with the ontologically objective mode of invariant quantitative relations and subsequently claiming the methodology of physics to be the appropriate method of analysis constitutes a category error. Human action is amenable to verbal logical analysis of the logical structure of the categories of human action from which qualitative laws and implications of action can be deduced. This is the only method of analysis appropriate for the ontologically subjective mode of existence of human action.[4]

The deontological explanation in a previous post, particularly with respect to social ontology, explains the ontologically subjective mode of existence of social institutions, within which ontologically subjective human action in society occurs. This ontology of social institutions is a part of the reason why the economic aspect of praxeology is valid a priori since the social institutions such as private property and money are all ontologically subjective linguistic creations. For example, the Quantity Theory of Money is valid a priori for the reason that money is an ontologically subjective social institution, and when one understands the epistemically objective concept of money and its function then simple analysis reveals that an increase in the quantity of money is inflation and no empirical testing is necessary to confirm this, nor could any empirical evidence refute its validity.

This does not deny the commodity origin of money as demonstrated by Mises’ Regression theorem (Mises, 1912: 30-33), but instead, it explains how commodities can become money in an epistemically objective manner by way of collective Intentionality. This point cannot be stressed sufficiently considering that this epistemic error results in irreconcilable conflict down through the chain in economic reasoning and can only be resolved by clarifying the controversy over the epistemological foundation of economics.

In short, the confusion and controversy over the foundation of the epistemology of economic theory, in particular, regarding the controversy over a prioristic praxeological reasoning, is the result of a systemic ambiguity in ontology. This is largely biased against any acknowledgment of the subjective ontological mode of existence as a result of the significant influence of the physicalist metaphysical view that emerged from the physical sciences and logical positivism (which praxeology directly battled against) in the social sciences. While this may at first appear to be a digression from the topic of rights, the economic examples are essential for the reason that it helps to provide concrete and well-established examples in order to understand essential aspects of praxeology, and furthermore, the economic elements will also prove to be essential for the analysis of rights.

[1] This is not to deny the importance of axiology, which is indeed utilized in subsequent sections. The point is that one cannot just make right claims from an axiology.

[2] For example, see (Rothbard, 1982: 258; Searle, 2010: 189-190; Scuton, 2017: 107, 121; Gibbons & Skinner, 2004)

[3] “The psychoanalytical subconscious is a psychological and not a praxeological category. Whether an action stems from clear deliberation, or from forgotten memories and suppressed desires which from submerged regions, as it were, direct the will, does not influence the nature of the action.” (Mises, 1949: 12)

[4] While the methods used in the psychological and social sciences do not use praxeological analysis, their methodology is not thereby entirely invalid. It must be understood that such methodology is regarding the behavior of persons based upon statistical analysis. While it is true that human behavior cannot be considered class probability due to its praxeological basis, there is still information to be learned from such analysis if the limitations of the evidence are understood.

Works Cited:

Bronowski; J. & Mazlish; Bruce. (1960) The Western Intellectual Tradition: From Leonardo to Hegel. New York, U.S.A.: Barnes & Noble Books (1993), ISBN: 0-88029-069-2.

Gibbons; Hugh & Skinner; Nicholas. (2004) “The Biological Basis of Human Rights.” url = https://www.bu.edu/law/journals-archive/pilj/vol13no1/documents/13-1gibbonsandskinnerarticle.pdf

Mises; Ludwig von. (1912) The Theory of Money & Credit. Auburn, U.S.A.: The Ludwig von Mises Institute (2009) ISBN: 978-1-933550-55-8. Available online: https://cdn.mises.org/Theory%20of%20Money%20and%20Credit.pdf

Mises; Ludwig von. (1949) Human Action: A Treatise on Economics. Auburn, U.S.A.: The Ludwig von Mises Institute, The Scholar’s Edition (1998) ISBN: 978-1-933550-31-2. Available online: https://cdn.mises.org/Human%20Action_3.pdf

Rothbard; Murray N. (1982) The Ethics of Liberty. New York, U.S.A.: New York University Press (2002) ISBN: 0-8147-7559-4.

Rothbard; Murray N. (2011) Economic Controversies. Auburn, U.S.A.:  The Ludwig von Mises Institute; 1st edition, ISBN: 978-1-933550-96-1.

Scruton; Roger. (2017) On Human Nature. Princeton, U.S.A.: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-16875-3.

Searle; John R. (2010) Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization. New York, U.S.A.: Oxford University Press, 1st edition, ISBN: 978-0-19-539617-1.