THE neurobiological account of rights robustly supports a methodological individualism, for there can be no conscious entities outside of individual organisms.[1] This neurobiological account further establishes clear boundaries between conscious organisms[2] and establishes the preconditions of knowledge and action. This provides empirical support to the formal methodological individualism found in both praxeology and the philosophy of mind and language in the deontological explanation, strengthening the overall case for a methodological individualism. This is counter to trends in contemporary philosophy that have been used to undermine methodological individualism, self-ownership, and private property rights.
However, it is noteworthy that while this neurobiological account strongly supports a robust methodological individualism, this does not preclude collective Intentionality and cooperation. In other words, this conception of methodological individualism does not prevent any collective or cooperative behavior for which individualism has often been wrongly criticized (Hayek, 1948: 1-32[3]). This requires an understanding of Intentionality,[4] but suffice it to say for this post that collective “we-intentions” are not reducible to individual “I-intentions” (Searle, 2010: 47).
Individual rights are necessary to protect the fundamental basis of all collective Intentionality which is and can only be the individual. In other words, social institutions can only be protected by protecting their very basis, which is individual acting conscious organisms. This is not to deny the existence of social institutions, but to properly understand their subjective ontology and protect them by protecting individual rights.
A somewhat similar objection is that collective Intentionality will lead to socialism,[5] implying that collective Intentionality is inherently collectivist. This is, however, a complete misunderstanding of Intentionality, for collective Intentionality is necessary for cooperation at the level of individual exchange as well as in a weaker sense the collective recognition of the social institutions required for the free-market such as private property, money, and so on.
It is critical to realize that cooperation by way of collective Intentionality occurs on the free-market at the individual level, not at the “macro” level. This, in no way, implies any central planning, interventionism, or collectivist ideology. While it is possible that there could be collective Intentionality more broadly if a large enough number of people recognized that their individual transactions helped social well-being in the long run, then it is possible that there could be collective Intentionality at this level, but still does not result in collectivism in the political-economic sense.
Furthermore, methodological individualism in no way implies psychological individualism: The two are often conflated as an argument against methodological individualism,[6] but this is a fallacy of ambiguity and an invalid objection once clarified.
Though originating from dichotomous religious views of salvation that emerged strongly as a result of the theology of the Roman Catholics and the resulting Protestant Reformation, these arguments largely stem from the general Enlightenment period where certain political philosophers such as Hobbes and Locke applied the most current understanding of atomistic Newtonian physics to the view of man and political philosophy along with the axiomatic-deductive method.
In reducing man to a “state of nature” prior to any society, they attempted to reduce man to the atom of physics and subsequently organize society based on this axiom. The methodological individualism of economic theory became associated with such a view, despite advances in economic theory that stressed a methodological individualism rather than a so-called atomistic ontological view of man and even stressed the the social nature of man.[7]
These differences were magnified by religious, social, and political conflict, particularly in the United States where the often more isolated and self-sufficient frontier life compared to Europe influenced, among other ideological and legal factors, a type of self-reliance that became an American “rugged individualism,” but this has no bearing on the methodological individualism used in praxeology and the philosophy of mind.
Aside from these considerations, more fundamentally, the very limited understanding of physics and, therefore, radically inadequate metaphysical understanding of the world, the erroneous atomistic view was opposed by an even more erroneous view of social realism in which society is viewed as an ontologically objective organism and the notion of the individual as a non-existent abstraction.
Unfortunately, due to woefully inadequate understanding of contemporary physics, erroneous metaphysical positions still predominate under the spell of Newton. This can be observed in the religious conviction to the physicalist worldview in contemporary science and academics and the denial of the subjective ontological mode of existence.
With such a poor understanding of the world, consciousness cannot be understood and neither can the ontology of society, resulting in the survival of the false dichotomy of atomistic individualism and its concomitant psychological individualism, social realism, and collectivism with all its historic influences.
Through an adequate understanding of contemporary physics, metaphysics, philosophy of mind and speech acts, this false dichotomy is resolved and the collective workings of society can be understood through methodological individualism, all the while acknowledging the negative aspects of psychological/sociological individualism without resorting to political-economic collectivism.
[1] Integrated Information Theory (Oizumi et al., 2014) provides an explicit reason why this is the case. While IIT itself does not solve the Hard Problem of consciousness (see Chalmers, 1995), a solution to this problem that accords well with IIT will be discussed in future posts here. Those who wish to disagree must put forth a theory of consciousness to support an opposing position. This is not to be mistaken with various stances in the philosophy of mind such as functionalism or computer functionalism, since these are not theories of consciousness. Also, “we just don’t really know” cannot be used as an argument, for this could be used to support any position and is therefore not a justification for any stance.
[2] That there are interdependencies and symbiotic relationships between organisms does not change the biological fact that there are clear boundaries between conscious organisms. Attempts to undermine this position can result from denying the reality of conscious experience and free will by treating all systems as mere physical systems that are the sum total of causal conditions in the organisms and environment. Such a position is not supported by contemporary science (Stapp, 2017: 10). Moreover, since the question involves boundaries between conscious organisms, any objections such as the fact that a human contains many billions of bacteria in its digestive system is inconsequential.
[3] In particular, Hayek clarifies an important misunderstanding: “I can give no better illustration of the prevailing confusion about the meaning of individualism than the fact that the man who to me seems to be one of the greatest representatives of true individualism, Edmund Burke, is commonly (and rightly) represented as the main opponent of the so-called “individualism” of Rousseau, whose theories he feared would rapidly dissolve the commonwealth “into the dust and powder of individuality,” and that the term “individualism” itself was first introduced into the English language through the translation of one of the works of another of the great representatives of true individualism, de Tocqueville, who uses it in his Democracy in America to describe an attitude which he deplores and rejects. Yet there can no doubt that both Burke and de Tocqueville stand in all essentials close to Adam Smith, to whom nobody will deny the title of individualist, and that the “individualism” to which they are opposed is something altogether different from that of Smith …” (https://cdn.mises.org/Individualism%20and%20Economic%20Order_4.pdf (pp. 4 (page 13 of PDF))
[4] Intentionality is the quality where mental states are of or about objects and states of affairs in the world (Searle, 1983: 1). This falls under the philosophy of mind and is a subject in and of itself that will be covered in future blog posts here. However, Searle’s book Intentionality is highly recommended to understand this topic.
[5] John Searle has raised this point in lecture on the philosophy of society. These lectures are available online: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLuFS1JW76zlJi0P99-_GT-_Js0wDXYibB
[6] Furthermore, the individualism of the French Revolution often seems to be conflated with the individualism of the American Revolution, despite the drastic differences as a result of being based upon the political philosophies of Rousseau and Locke respectively.
[7] For instance, Ludwig von Mises stated that “The advantages derived from peaceful cooperation and division of labor are universal. They immediately benefit every generation, and not only later descendants. For what the individual must sacrifice for the sake of society he is amply compensated by greater advantages. His sacrifice is only apparent and temporary; he foregoes a smaller gain in order to reap a greater one later. No reasonable being can fail to see this obvious fact. […] In striving after his own—rightly understood—interests the individual works toward an intensification of social cooperation and peaceful intercourse.” (Mises, 1949: 146)
Works Cited:
Chalmers; David J. (1995) “Facing up to the problem of consciousness.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 2: 200-19.
Hayek; Friedrich A. (1948) Individualism and Economic Order. Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.: University of Chicago Press, ISBN: 978-0-226-32093-9. Available online: https://cdn.mises.org/Individualism%20and%20Economic%20Order_4.pdf
Mises; Ludwig von. (1949) Human Action: A Treatise on Economics. Auburn, U.S.A.: The Ludwig von Mises Institute, The Scholar’s Edition (1998) ISBN: 978-1-933550-31-2. Available online: https://cdn.mises.org/Human%20Action_3.pdf
Oizumi; M., Albantakis; L., Tononi; G. (2014) “From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0” PLoS Computational Biology 10(5): e1003588. Doi: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003588. https://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003588&type=printable
Searle; John R. (1983) Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. New York, U.S.A.: Cambridge University Press (1989) ISBN: 0-521-27302-1.
Searle; John R. (2010) Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization. New York, U.S.A.: Oxford University Press, 1 edition, ISBN: 978-0-19-539617-1.
Stapp; Henry P. (2017) Quantum Theory and Free Will: How Mental Intentions Translate into Bodily Actions. New York, U.S.A.: Springer; 1st edition, ISBN: 978-3-319-58300-6.
